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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between the bitcoin price and the hashrate by disen-
tangling the effects of the energy efficiency of the bitcoin mining equipment, bitcoin halving, and of
structural breaks on the price dynamics. For this purpose, we propose a methodology based on expo-
nential smoothing to model the dynamics of the Bitcoin network energy efficiency. We consider either
directly the hashrate or the bitcoin cost-of-production model (CPM) as a proxy for the hashrate,
to take any nonlinearity into account. In the first examined sub-sample (01/08/2016-04/12/2017),
the hashrate and the CPMs were never significant, while a significant cointegration relationship was
found in the second sub-sample (11/12/2017-24/02/2020). The empirical evidence shows that it is
better to consider the hashrate directly rather than its proxy represented by the CPM when modeling
its relationship with the bitcoin price. Moreover, the causality is always uni-directional going from
the bitcoin price to the hashrate (or its proxies), with lags ranging from 1 week up to 6 weeks later.
These findings are consistent with a large literature in energy economics, which showed that oil and
gas returns affect the purchase of the drilling rigs with a delay of up to 3 months, whereas the impact
of changes in the rig count on oil and gas returns is limited or not significant.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing interest in bitcoin price dynamics both among the general public and in academia,
see Burniske and Tatar (2018), Brummer (2019), Fantazzini (2019), Schar and Berentsen (2020). The
price is not only important for purely speculative reasons but also for its role in the energy consumption
of the Bitcoin network, and in affecting the future behavior of miners — agents who power the Bitcoin
infrastructure by issuing new blocks containing the latest transactions.
There is a long-lived perception that the bitcoin price and the hashrate (i.e. the number of compu-
tations done by bitcoin miners) are connected, see for example Cointelegraph (2020). Some works in the
financial literature went further and theorized that the movements of the hashrate are useful in predicting
the bitcoin price (Hayes (2017), Hayes (2019), Aoyagi and Hattori (2019)). At first glance, such a notion
might seem wrong because producers are price-takers in competitive markets, and the amount of effort
they put into the production of a good or service have no impact over the market price. However, this
might not be the case for the bitcoin market. First, there are only a few mining pool operators, so that
they can coordinate their actions in an attempt to control the market price. Second, the fact that bitcoin
supply is inelastic and the mining business is very competitive might force miners to operate differently:
they might be willing to cap their income by hedging their losses with the bitcoin futures introduced
by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the CBOE in December 2017 (Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(2017)), as discussed in the cryptocurrency professional literature (see, for example, the several articles
published on coindesk.com and cointelegraph.com)1. The exact economical behavior of miners is
unknown and its modelling is beyond the scope of this paper. However, if we focus only on the influence
of the hashrate on the bitcoin price dynamics, we can resort either to econometric models or to a general
equilibrium model that omits the inner workings of miners’ decision-making but directly models the
relationship between the hashrate and the price. Such an approach was first proposed by Hayes (2017),
who put forward a methodology able to predict the bitcoin price using the total hashrate and the miners’
energy efficiency as inputs. Hayes (2019) showed that this model provided a surprisingly good fit and
its equilibrium price was able to Granger-cause the bitcoin price. On the other hand, several works
explained the dynamics of the bitcoin price using econometric models and various sets of explanatory
variables, and they mostly found that the hashrate is not statistically significant and it does not help in
predicting the bitcoin price, see Kjærland et al. (2018) and references therein.
These conflicting results drew our attention and became the main motivation for this work: we
1However, we want to remark that in the period examined in this paper, the daily transaction volume was approximately
1-2 million BTCs, while the daily trading volume on the exchanges was up to 5-7 million BTCs. Instead, the total daily
supply of new bitcoins was equal to 1800 BTCs, which indicates that the miners’ influence on the bitcoin price may be
actually very small. The authors want to thank the anonymous CIO of one of the world’s leading full-service blockchain
technology companies for highlighting this issue.
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initially thought that this contradictory evidence could have been due to different sample periods (hence
different price drivers at different times), but this is not the case: they largely intersect. A possible
explanation could be that the hashrate is not useful in predicting the bitcoin price on its own, but it has
a more complex relationship with it, as discussed by Hayes (2017).
In this paper, we examine the relationship between the hashrate (or the bitcoin cost-of-production
price) and the market price, and we try to reconcile the previous contradictory findings by disentangling
the effects of the energy efficiency of the bitcoin mining equipment, bitcoin halving, and of structural
breaks on the price dynamics.
The first contribution of the paper is a methodology based on exponential smoothing to model the
dynamics of the Bitcoin network energy efficiency as a whole. This type of smoothing naturally trails the
data and it does not use future values: the data related to future mining equipment cannot be used to
infer today’s performance to avoid any form of look-ahead bias. Moreover, this approach easily models
the gradual replacement of old equipment with the new units.
The second contribution of the paper is a set of multivariate models to investigate the nature of the
relationship between the bitcoin market price and the hashrate, both directly or through the proxy of
production costs.
The third contribution of the paper is a robustness check to verify how our results change when
computing the bitcoin cost-of-production using an electricity price no more fixed to a constant, but equal
to the daily data of the Nord pool system price, which is the unconstrained market-clearing reference
price for the European Nordic region.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the literature devoted to bitcoin and the
cost-of-production model, while the methods proposed to investigate the relationship between the bitcoin
market price and the hashrate are discussed in Section 3. The empirical results are reported in Section
4, while a robustness check is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 briefly concludes. A brief overview of
Bitcoin’s operation is reported in the Appendix.
2 Literature review
One of the main approaches to model the bitcoin price behavior was introduced by Hayes (2017), and it
is usually known as the “cost-of-production model” (CPM). The core of this approach is the attempt to
derive the bitcoin cost of production for a given miner from the current state of the network, the energy
prices, and the energy efficiency of the miner’s equipment. The CPM thus gives the break-even cost of
mining, which any individual miner would use when trying to define whether he should be involved in
mining bitcoin. Hayes (2017) generalized this approach for the whole network.
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Hayes (2017) makes a few assumptions to estimate the main drivers of the bitcoin price. The first one
is that the more computational power is employed by the Bitcoin network, the higher its value is. The
second assumption simply states that all miners are rational, meaning that they are only willing to mine
for bitcoin if they are looking to extract profit. This also implicitly means that any other cryptocurrency
with no demand for it would have zero value and zero mining effort employed, and a rational miner would
redirect its resources elsewhere. The third and final assumption is that the network difficulty can be
used as a proxy of the aggregate mining power. Within the Bitcoin network, this assumption is directly
supported by the algorithm governing it: difficulty always readjusts to ease off the effect of increased
mining power or, in the opposite case, to make up for its decrease. Hayes (2017) builds a framework
aimed at showing the connection between the computational power employed by a miner and its expected
profit given the current network conditions. When a single miner estimates its baseline profitability, it
first calculates the expected number of bitcoins produced per day:
BTC
day
=
(
βρ · sechr
δ · 232
)
hrday
where β is block reward (bitcoin per block), δ is the difficulty (expressed in units of Giga-Hash/block),
ρ is the hashing power employed by a miner expressed in Giga-Hash/second, sechr is the number of
seconds in an hour, hrday is a number of hours in a day and 1/2
32 is a normalized probability of a single
hash “solving” a block, and is an attribute of the mining algorithm. These three constants can be fit
into a single parameter θ, so the formula takes the following view:
BTC
day
=
(
βρ
δ
)
θ, θ = hrday · sechr/2
32 (1)
The daily cost of mining can be expressed as follows,
Eday =
(
ρ
1000 GH/s
)(
$
kWh
· EEF · hrday
)
(2)
where Eday is the cost per day for a producer, $/kWh is the price of a kilowatt-hour, and EEF is the
energy consumption efficiency of the miner’s hardware. Given the assumption of perfect competition so
that the marginal cost of production and the marginal profit are equal, the equilibrium price takes the
following form:
P =
Eday
BTC/day
=
$
kWh
· EEF · hrday · δ
β · 1000 GH/s · θ
(3)
where we set ρ = 1000 GH/s as in Hayes (2017). The CPM offers a simple but effective framework for
estimating the cost of production price. However, it simplifies the mining expenses by dismissing several
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other important factors, such as the capital and the operational expenses of the running mining operation.
Another important drawback of this model emerges around the times of the bitcoin halving events, when
the reward in bitcoins for finding new blocks is cut in half: unlike real-world miners, this model does not
anticipate this change and therefore it produces unreliable results (this issue will be discussed later in
this paper). Interestingly, Hayes (2019) found that the CPM Granger-causes the market price but not
the other way around.
It is important to remark that the CPM proposed by Hayes (2017, 2019) requires a few inputs which
cannot be directly observed or reliably approximated: one such input is the electricity cost, which is
assumed by Hayes to be a constant equal to USD 0.135 per kWh — an average rate for electricity
worldwide at the time of publishing those two papers. Of course, this is not always the case for miners:
there are multiple reports of some miners having free energy (either as a form of subsidy or just by using
it covertly), which are cited and discussed in Stoll et al. (2019). Another input is the parameter for the
equipment’s energy efficiency : while it is possible to determine the best mining equipment available at
a certain point in time, it is impossible to know the distribution of this equipment among miners and
thus the average energy efficiency of the network. Moreover, there are ASIC models whose presence on
the market is very limited, but the impact may be high, like -for example- the GMO miners (gmominer.
z.com/en). Therefore, this situation makes it very difficult to assess the real picture of the total energy
efficiency. The CPM relies heavily on the above-mentioned data (particularly the energy efficiency), so
one has to be very careful when fixing these two parameters.
Kristoufek (2015) was among the first to highlight that the drivers behind the bitcoin price tend
to vary over time due to the “dynamic nature of bitcoin and its rapid price fluctuations”. This idea
was later developed and expanded by Kjærland et al. (2018), who used several major commodities and
indices, different metrics from the Bitcoin network, and the Google Trends data as explanatory variables
to find which factors affect the bitcoin price dynamics. Kjærland et al. (2018) transformed the original
daily data into weekly averages to avoid potential issues related to autocorrelation. Moreover, they
also deal with outliers in the data and structural breaks. The data sample was then divided into three
smaller periods, and Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) and Generalized Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) were estimated. Contrary to the findings reported by Hayes (2017, 2019),
Kjærland et al. (2018) found that the hashrate of the bitcoin network does not impact the bitcoin market
price, and the only period when it seemed to do so was during the bitcoin exponential growth in 2017.
They concluded that, if anything, it is more likely that the bitcoin price impacts the hashrate than
vice-versa. Interestingly, they also found that the efficient market hypothesis appears not to hold, as the
current bitcoin price can be explained by its own lags: they assume that investors are probably affected
by the momentum effect of rising prices and vice versa where, as the price rapidly rises, “investors see
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get-rich-quick potential by buying now and selling to a greater fool next week”, see Santoni et al. (1987) for
a review of the “Greater Fool theory” and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) for a detailed discussion
of the “Momentum theory”. Furthermore, they also showed that Google Trends data has a positive and
significant impact on bitcoin price (similar to previous studies), and the S&P500 has a positive impact on
bitcoin price as well, interpreting this index as an indicator of investors’ overall optimism and willingness
to invest in any assets. Gold and oil are found to be insignificant, as well as the VIX index2 (except for
one period).
3 Materials and Methods
The main goal of this paper is to investigate the nature of the relationship between the bitcoin market
price and the hashrate, either directly or through the proxy of production costs. Since we do not know
the true nature of this relationship, we try to model it with a large set of econometric models.
First, we look for any direct relationship between the market price and the hashrate, or between the
market price and the cost of production price. This process follows these steps:
1. We test each variable for unit roots allowing for a structural break.
2. If the null of a unit root is rejected and a significant break is found, the sample is divided into
two sub-periods, and we test for cointegration between the market price and the cost-of-production
price, or between the market price and the hashrate, in all sub-samples. Depending on the test
result, either a bivariate cointegrated model or a bivariate vector-autoregression (VAR) model with
variables in the first differences is estimated.
3. We test for Granger causality using the approach by Toda and Yamamoto (1995), which is consistent
even if the processes may be integrated or cointegrated of arbitrary order. More specifically, this
approach requires to determine the optimal VAR lag length k for the variables in levels using
information criteria, and then to estimate a (k + dmax)th-order VAR where dmax is the maximum
order of integration for our group of time-series. Toda and Yamamoto (1995) show that we can
test linear or nonlinear restrictions on the first k coefficient matrices using standard asymptotic
theory, while the coefficient matrices of the last k + dmax lagged vectors must be ignored. This
Granger-causality test is performed in all sub-samples.
Even though this bivariate analysis can be a useful starting point, a full multivariate analysis is needed
to analyze the bitcoin price dynamics, and to avoid any potential omitted-variable bias. We considered
2The VIX Index is an estimate of the 30-day expected volatility of the U.S. stock market, based on real-time, mid-quote
prices of SP500 Index call and put option, see http://www.cboe.com/vix for more details.
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the set of variables used by Kjærland et al. (2018) because these explanatory variables represent a good
summary of what the literature has found so far in terms of factors affecting the bitcoin price. This set
was augmented with the cost-of-production price, which served as an alternative to the hashrate.
To select the best multivariate model, we followed the structural relationship identification method-
ology discussed by Sa-ngasoongsong et al. (2012) and Fantazzini and Toktamysova (2015). In a nutshell,
the first step is to identify the order of integration using unit root tests and, if all variables are sta-
tionary, VAR or VARX (Vector Autoregressive with exogenous variables) models are used. The second
step determines the exogeneity of each variable using the sequential reduction method for weak exo-
geneity by Greenslade et al. (2002), who consider weakly exogenous each variable for which the test is
not rejected and re-test the remaining variables until all weakly exogenous variables are identified. For
non-stationary variables, cointegration rank tests are employed to determine the presence of a long-run
relationship among the endogenous variables: if this is the case, VECM or VECMX (Vector Error Correc-
tion model with exogenous variables) models are used, otherwise, VAR or VARX models with variables
in differences are applied, see Sa-ngasoongsong et al. (2012) and Fantazzini and Toktamysova (2015) for
more details. However, our approach differs from the latter in that we employ unit root tests allowing
for a structural break: if a significant break is found, the sample is divided into two sub-samples and the
next steps are computed with these samples separately, similarly to the analysis performed by Kjærland
et al. (2018) with bitcoin prices.
We remark that the cost-of-production price is strongly affected by three parameters: the energy
efficiency of the Bitcoin network, the electricity price, and the bitcoin reward when a new block is
created. Setting the first two parameters is not straightforward and several variants can be used, while
the third parameter can cause undesired effects at the time of the bitcoin halving events when the bitcoin
reward is cut in half. We discuss these issues in the next sections, while a summary of our modeling
strategy is presented in Figure 1.
3.1 An exponential smoothing approach to model the dynamics of the Bit-
coin network energy efficiency
One of the most important parameters of the CPM described by equations (1)-(3) is the energy efficiency
of the mining equipment for the whole Bitcoin network. Finding a reliable estimate for this parameter
is a very challenging task due to the scarcity of data for most mining pools, if not the complete lack of
data. Hayes (2019) computed this parameter by extracting energy efficiency data from Bitcoin mining
hardware manufacturer websites and by checking them against a dedicated wiki page that catalogs the
efficiency of the mining hardware (https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Mining_hardware_comparison). He
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Figure 1: Modeling strategy to investigate the nature of the relationship between the bitcoin market
price and the hashrate (either directly or through the proxy of production costs).
then ...“collected these data for each date of difficulty change in the Bitcoin network, scraped from the web
using the internet archive’s wayback machine”. The network energy efficiency was finally computed using
a power log-function applied to these data3. We tried to replicate and extend the Hayes’ estimated energy
efficiency by web scraping data from the previous “Mining hardware comparison” webpage. However,
when we overlaid the energy efficiency estimated by Hayes (2019) with the scraped ASIC data, we found
some anomalies, see Figure 2: at the end of 2015 and until the beginning of 2016, the estimated energy
efficiency suddenly changes but the ASIC release data do not. Moreover, during the first months of
2018, several new releases were introduced but the estimated energy efficiency always stays above these
releases. Furthermore, there is a line of violet dots constant at 1 Joule/GH which corresponds to USB
miners, which are no more competitive products but they still seem to be included in the computation
of the energy efficiency even in 2017-2018.
Given these issues, we decided to follow a different approach. First, we examined a couple of websites
that catalog the bitcoin mining equipment (see ASIC miner value (2020) and Crypto Mining Tools
(2020)), and we scraped their data and cross-checked it with vendor websites and online marketplaces
to find any possible discrepancies. Then, following the idea proposed by Stoll et al. (2019) to compute
lower and upper bands for the energy efficiency, we decided to use two alternative Holt-Winters double
exponential smoothing with the scraped data to model the dynamics of the energy efficiency for the whole
Bitcoin network. We chose this kind of methodology for the following reasons:
1. This type of smoothing naturally trails the data and it can model the gradual replacement of old
equipment with the new one. Changing the coefficients of the smoothing function impacts the
length of such lag.
3The authors want to thank Adam Hayes for providing this information through private communications.
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Figure 2: Energy efficiency of ASIC data scraped from the “Mining hardware comparison” webpage, and
the network energy efficiency reported by Hayes (2019). Logarithmic scale.
2. It accounts for a trend that is present in the data.
3. The energy efficiency of future ASICs cannot be used to infer today’s performance, so any smoothing
function referring to future values cannot be used.
The Holt-Winters double exponential smoothing function and its parameters for two alternative
models are reported below:
St = αyt + (1− α)(St−1 + bt−1)
bt = β(St − St−1) + (1− β)bt−1
S1 = y1; b1 = y2 − y1
Model 1 : α = 0.02, β = 0.06
Model 2 : α = 0.1, β = 0.2
(4)
where yt is the raw data sequence of ASICs energy efficiencies (measured in Joule/Giga-Hash), St is the
smoothed value at time t and it represents an estimate of the energy efficiency for the whole Bitcoin
network, while bt is the estimate of the trend at time t. The parameters for the two alternative smothing
models were chosen to give the equipment a reasonable replacement rate of 2-3 months4, and to get two
4When buying new ASICs in the market, it usually takes 6-8 months from the release date to the widespread implemen-
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smoothed curves: one with slow and smooth energy efficiency development over time, and the other with
more abrupt changes around the release dates of new hardware. Using this approach, we computed the
change of the network energy efficiency over time that is reported in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Energy efficiency curves estimated with models 1 and 2 in (4) for the whole Bitcoin network,
and the respective ASIC releases. The reported data are measured in Joule/Giga-Hash.
3.2 The cost-of-production model and electricity prices
The electricity price was fixed to a constant (0.13 dollars per kWh), similarly to Hayes (2017, 2019).
Even though the actual electricity price might be lower for miners — after all, they are active seekers
of cheap electricity — we chose this level for two reasons: 1) there is no better-educated guess; 2) if
we assume electricity prices which are potentially higher than the real ones, we can capture the effect
of some other mining operational expenses, as discussed by Stoll et al. (2019). This assumption will be
relaxed in Section 5, where we will discuss a robustness check involving electricity prices changing every
day.
3.3 The cost-of-production model and the bitcoin reward halving
The bitcoin halving happens once approximately every four years and cuts the block reward (and thus
the future cash flows of miners) in half. The cost-of-production model does not account for this effect, but
miners are aware of it and anticipate it. This is why the market price does not change significantly near
tation. Instead, if the company employs its miners, then the implementation time is down to 1 month from the release. The
authors want to thank again the anonymous CIO of one of the world’s leading full-service blockchain technology companies
for providing this information.
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the times of halving, whereas the cost-of-production model shows a sudden break in its equilibrium price.
This effect is shown in Figure 4 where a cost-of-production model is considered with two different inputs
for the network energy efficiency: one as originally published by Hayes (2019) and another estimated
using the first smoothing model in eq. (4).
Figure 4: A sudden jump can be seen just before August 2016, highlighting the drawback of cost of
production model. Logarithmic scale.
Even though the two models differ due to the different methodologies used for computing the network
energy efficiency, they both show the same jump in prices at the time of the halving event in July 2016.
It is for this reason that our empirical analysis considered only bitcoin market prices between August
2016 and February 2020 to exclude the two halving events which took place in July 2016 and May
2020, respectively. Accounting for these breaks and the change in miners’ behavior would have required
additional assumptions and model complexities that would have probably weakened the overall analysis.
This is why we leave it as an avenue for further research, and we refer the interested reader to Pagnotta
and Buraschi (2018) and Pagnotta (2020) for two recent theoretical models dealing with this issue5 6.
4 Results
4.1 Data
The dataset examined in this paper consists of weekly data ranging from 1 August 2016 till 29 February
2020: similarly to Kjærland et al. (2018), we transformed the original daily data into weekly averages to
avoid potential issues related to autocorrelation. The motivation for such a time sample was to get the
5Pagnotta and Buraschi (2018) and Pagnotta (2020) developed two theoretical models to address the determination of
bitcoin prices, which involve the bitcoin hashrate, the reward halving, and several other variables. They showed that the
effect of the reward halving on the bitcoin price is rather complex, and may be positive or negative, depending on the other
market factors.
6All the cryptocurrencies professionals that we contacted for this research work informed us that the effect of the reward
halving on the bitcoin price may take up to 9-12 months, from the official moment when the bitcoin reward is halved, up
to the moment it is reflected in the market prices.
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most recent data but, at the same time, to avoid any bitcoin halving events: as we discussed in section
3.3, the nature of these events is unique and should be studied separately.
The variables used in this paper and the reasons for using them largely follow Kjærland et al. (2018).
However, there are also three important differences. First, we did not consider oil prices and VIX in our
analysis: they were shown to be not statistically significant in Kjærland et al. (2018) and they kept being
not significant in our study, so we preferred to have a smaller set of variables to increase the efficiency of
our final estimates. Second, we added a variable measuring the transaction fees: this variable does not
just show the public interest in bitcoin, but rather reveals the real “invested” interest: that is, the actual
amount of money that the users are willing to give up in commissions to move their bitcoins. Third, we
consider the CPM estimated using the inputs discussed in Section 3 as an alternative to the hashrate.
A description of the variables used in the empirical analysis is reported in Table 1, while their plots are
reported in Figure 5. Instead, the cost-of-production model prices computed using the two smoothed
energy efficiency curves discussed in section 3.1 are shown in Figure 6, together with the bitcoin market
price.
Variable Description Source
Bitcoin price (USD) Coinmarketcap computes an average price weighted
by the trade volume of the exchanges that offer
bitcoin trading pairs.
Coinmarketcap.com
Hashrate It is measured in tera-hashes per second (one hash
is equal to a double SHA-256 computation)
Coinmetrics.io
Transaction fees (USD) This is the total amount of money paid by the users
for the service of moving their funds. It is computed
as the weekly average of the total daily transaction
fees in bitcoin multiplied with the weekly average
of the bitcoin price.
Coinmetrics.io
Transaction volume (USD) This is the total value transacted on the Bitcoin
network multiplied with the weekly average of the
bitcoin price.
Coinmetrics.io
Google Trends Weekly search data for the word “bitcoin” world-
wide
trends.google.com
Gold Price (✩/Ounce) Price in USD per troy ounce as reported by the
London Bullion Market Association. Gold is often
compared with bitcoin, and the reported similar-
ities include: limited supply, low correlation with
stock markets and its main use as store of value
rather than unit of account.
Quandl.com
SP500 This index is taken as an indicator of the general
public perception of the global markets. We as-
sume public optimism towards investment to play
a certain role in the demand for bitcoin.
Yahoo Finance
Table 1: Description of the explanatory variables used in the analysis.
We analyzed the stationarity of our variables using a set of unit root tests allowing for a potential
endogenous structural break, both under the null of a unit root and under the alternative. We justify
this choice considering that there is literature showing that there was a financial bubble in the bitcoin
prices in 2016-2017 that burst at the beginning of 2018, see Corbet et al. (2018), Fry (2018), Gerlach
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Figure 5: Variables used in the analysis.
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Figure 6: Cost-of-production model prices: Model 1 and Model 2 from eq.(4).
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et al. (2019), and Xiong et al. (2020). Moreover, there is also a debate on whether the introduction of
bitcoin futures in December 2017 crashed the market prices: in this regard, the evidence is more mixed
with Hattori and Ishida (2020) concluding that bitcoin futures did not lead to the crash of the bitcoin
market, whereas Liu et al. (2019) and Jalan et al. (2019) affirming that they were to an extent responsible
for the crash of bitcoin prices in 2018. However, Baig et al. (2020) and Ko¨chling et al. (2019) showed
that the introduction of bitcoin futures indeed improved the efficiency of the bitcoin markets. Given this
evidence, we employed two types of unit root tests: the Vogelsang and Perron (1998) test and the Lee
and Strazicich (2003) test, both of them allowing for one endogenous break. The results of these tests
for the log-transformed variables and their log-returns are reported in Table 2.
Vogelsang and Perron (1998) Lee and Strazicich (2003)
Variable t-statistic Break Date t-statistic Break Date
Log(Bitcoin price) -3.43 20/03/2017 -1.72 10/07/2017
Log(Hashrate) -3.46 06/11/2017 -2.05 06/11/2017
Log(Transaction fees) -2.69 04/12/2017 -2.56 18/06/2018
Log(Transaction volume) -3.55 17/04/2017 -2.07 24/07/2017
Log(Google) -3.01 24/04/2017 -2.11 15/05/2017
Log(Gold) -3.14 03/06/2019 -2.59 05/08/2019
Log(SP500) -2.84 17/12/2018 -3.36 15/10/2018
DLog(Bitcoin price) -13.45* 04/12/2017 -7.89* 27/11/2017
DLog(Hashrate) -25.75* 30/07/2018 -4.32* 19/11/2018
DLog(Transaction fees) -11.68* 01/04/2019 -5.73* 27/11/2017
DLog(Transaction volume) -15.66* 04/12/2017 -7.71* 15/01/2018
DLog(Google) -15.18* 27/11/2017 -8.45* 06/11/2017
DLog(Gold) -12.61* 19/12/2016 -5.22* 16/04/2018
DLog(SP500) -15.20* 17/02/2020 -8.54* 03/12/2018
Table 2: Unit root tests. Null hypothesis: the time series has a unit root. * Significant at the 5% level.
The results in Table 2 show that all time series are not stationary, with structural breaks mainly
located at the end of 2017 (particularly for bitcoin-related variables), which is consistent with the past
financial literature dealing with bitcoin prices. Given this evidence, we fixed a break date on 10 December
2017, which is the day when the first bitcoin futures were introduced on the CBOE, and we divided our
dataset into two samples: 01/08/2016-04/12/2017 and 11/12/2017-24/02/2020. The next steps of our
empirical analysis were then performed with these samples separately.
4.2 Bivariate analysis
The next step of our investigation was to test for cointegration (in all sub-samples) between the market
price and the cost-of-production price, or between the market price and the hashrate. We also tested
for Granger causality using the approach by Toda and Yamamoto (1995), which is consistent even if the
processes may be integrated or cointegrated of arbitrary order. Note that the Granger representation
theorem by Engle and Granger (1987) assures us that if two or more time-series are cointegrated, then
there must be Granger causality between them because the error correction term enters at least one of
the equations of the error correction model. However, the presence of Granger causality (either one-way
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or in both directions) does not necessarily imply that the series are cointegrated, see Lu¨tkepohl (2005)-
chapters 6-7 and references therein for more details. The results of the Granger causality tests using
the Toda-Yamamoto (1995) approach and of the bivariate Johansen cointegration tests are reported in
Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
First sample: 01/08/2016-04/12/2017
Dependent variable (Y)
Log(Bitcoin price) Log(CPM model 1) Log(CPM model 2) Log(Hashrate)
Log(Bitcoin price) / 0.92 0.66 0.82
Regressor Log(CPM model 1) 0.92 / / /
(X) Log(CPM model 2) 0.95 / / /
Log(Hashrate) 0.52 / / /
Second sample: 11/12/2017-24/02/2020
Dependent variable (Y)
Log(Bitcoin price) Log(CPM model 1) Log(CPM model 2) Log(Hashrate)
Log(Bitcoin price) / 0.06 0.01 0.00
Regressor Log(CPM model 1) 0.90 / / /
(X) Log(CPM model 2) 0.33 / / /
Log(Hashrate) 0.10 / / /
Table 3: P-values for the Granger causality tests using the Toda-Yamamoto (1995) approach. The tests
for the CPM(model 1)-CPM(model 2), CPM(model 1)-Hashrate, and CPM(model 2)-Hashrate pairs
were not computed for obvious reasons, given how the CPMs are constructed. P-values smaller than 0.05
are in bold font.
01/08/2016-04/12/2017 11/12/2017-24/02/2020
Bivariate variable pair N. of CEs at 5% level N. of CEs at 5% level
Log(Bitcoin price), Log(CPM model 1) 0 1
Log(Bitcoin price), Log(CPM model 2) 0 1
Log(Bitcoin price), Log(Hashrate) 0 1
Table 4: Bivariate Johansen cointegration tests. The null hypothesis is the absence of cointegration. All
the tests considered the case of an intercept in the cointegration equation (CE) only.
First sample: 01/08/2016-04/12/2017
Bivariate variable pair: Bivariate variable pair: Bivariate variable pair:
Log(Bitcoin price), Log(Bitcoin price), Log(Bitcoin price),
Log(CPM model 1) Log(CPM model 2) Log(Hashrate)
Model selected VAR(0) for Log-returns VAR(0) for Log-returns VAR(1) for Log-returns
Multivariate LM test (lag 4) 0.33 0.59 0.45
Multivariate LM test (lag 8) 0.87 0.85 0.26
Multivariate LM test (lag 12) 0.45 0.64 0.60
Multivariate White test 0.00 0.08 0.00
Multivariate Normality test 0.00 0.00 0.58
BDS (dim=6) residuals 1st eq. 0.16 0.16 0.47
BDS (dim=6) residuals 2nd eq. 0.48 0.31 0.50
Is bitcoin price weakly exogenous? Yes Yes Yes (short-run: pvalue=0.29)
Second sample: 11/12/2017-24/02/2020
Bivariate variable pair: Bivariate variable pair: Bivariate variable pair:
Log(Bitcoin price), Log(Bitcoin price), Log(Bitcoin price),
Log(CPM model 1) Log(CPM model 2) Log(Hashrate)
Model selected VECM(0) VECM(2) VECM(6)
Multivariate LM test (lag 4) 0.08 0.15 0.20
Multivariate LM test (lag 8) 0.44 0.21 0.36
Multivariate LM test (lag 12) 0.64 0.54 0.91
Multivariate White test 0.00 0.00 0.07
Multivariate Normality test 0.00 0.00 0.58
BDS (dim=6) residuals 1st eq. 0.00 0.00 0.02
BDS (dim=6) residuals 2nd eq. 0.02 0.85 0.88
Is bitcoin price weakly exogenous? Yes (long-run: pvalue=0.08) Yes (long-run: pvalue=0.37) Yes (long-run: pvalue=0.06)
(short-run: pvalue=0.97) (short-run: pvalue=0.07)
Table 5: Misspecification tests on the residuals from the bivariate models. P-values smaller than 5% are
reported in bold font.
Tables 3 and 4 show that there is neither evidence of Granger-causality nor cointegration in the
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first sample (01/08/2016-04/12/2017), whereas there is evidence of unidirectional Granger-causality and
cointegration in the second sample (11/12/2017-24/02/2020), going from the bitcoin price to the hashrate
(or to the CPM) but not vice versa. The final estimated bivariate models for both sub-samples are
reported in Tables 9-14 in Appendix B, while the misspecification tests for these models are reported in
Table 5 7. In this regard, we computed the following battery of misspecification tests with the models’
residuals: the multivariate Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for residual serial correlation up to a specified
order, the multivariate Jarque-Bera normality test, and the multivariate White heteroskedasticity test,
see Johansen et al. (1995) and Lu¨tkepohl (2005) for more details. We also calculated the BDS test by
Broock et al. (1996) to test whether the residuals are independent and identically distributed (iid) and
which is robust against a variety of possible deviations from independence, including linear dependence,
non-linear dependence, or chaos. Finally, we computed block exogeneity Wald tests to check whether
the bitcoin price can be treated as exogenous, by testing for the joint significance of each of the other
lagged endogenous variables in the bitcoin equation (provided that lagged variables are present). If
VECMs were used, we also tested that the factor loading associated with the error correction term in
the bitcoin equation was not statistically different from zero. For ease of reference, we referred to the
block exogeneity Wald test in Table 5 as short-run, while to the test on the factor loading as long-run.
Tables 9-14 and Table 5 show that simple bivariate random walk models and a VAR(1) for log-
returns were sufficient to model the weak dynamics of the bitcoin prices and the hashrate/CPMs in
the first sample, while vector error correction models (VECMs) were used in the second sample. It is
possible to note that the hashrate and the CPMs did not have any effect on the bitcoin price in any
period and model, whereas the bitcoin price affected the hashrate/CPMs with lags ranging from 1 week
up to 6 weeks later, depending on the model specification. Interestingly, the models using the hashrate
showed always better misspecification tests than those using the CPMs. Moreover, the lagged effects
of bitcoin prices on the hashrate were generally longer than the same effects on the CPMs, and these
longer lags are more realistic given that it takes time to update the mining equipment. Therefore, this
initial bivariate evidence seems to highlight that it is better to consider the hashrate directly rather than
its proxy represented by the bitcoin cost-of-production model when modelling its relationship with the
bitcoin price.
4.3 Multivariate analysis
The next step in our analysis was to select the best multivariate model using the structural relationship
identification methodology suggested by Sa-ngasoongsong et al. (2012) and Fantazzini and Toktamysova
7The numbers of lags in the final VAR/VEC models were selected using the Akaike information criteria and to make
the residuals no more auto-correlated.
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(2015), and the variables described in section 4.1. The results of the sequential reduction method for
weak exogeneity using the Wald test by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) are reported in Table 6: only Google
search data and transaction fees were found to be endogenous during the first sub-sample (01/08/2016-
04/12/2017), while the transaction volume, the hashrate and the CPMs 1 and 2 were endogenous variables
in the second sub-sample (11/12/2017-24/02/2020). We then proceeded to test for cointegration using
the variables which were deemed endogenous according to the previous sequential test procedure, and
the results of the Johansen cointegration tests are reported in Table 7. The final estimated multivariate
models for both sub-samples are reported in Tables 15-18 in Appendix B, while the misspecification tests
for these models are reported in Table 8.
First Sample: 01/08/2016-04/12/2017
Log(Transaction Fees) Log(Transaction Volume) Log(Hashrate) Log(SP500) Log(GOLD) Log(Google)
V
Log(Transaction Fees) Log(Transaction Volume) Log(CPM model 1) Log(SP500) Log(GOLD) Log(Google)
V
Log(Transaction Fees) Log(Transaction Volume) Log(CPM model 2) Log(SP500) Log(GOLD) Log(Google)
V
Second Sample: 11/12/2017-24/02/2020
Log(Transaction Fees) Log(Transaction Volume) Log(Hashrate) Log(SP500) Log(GOLD) Log(Google)
V
Log(Transaction Fees) Log(Transaction Volume) Log(CPM model 1) Log(SP500) Log(GOLD) Log(Google)
V V
Log(Transaction Fees) Log(Transaction Volume) Log(CPM model 2) Log(SP500) Log(GOLD) Log(Google)
V
Table 6: Weak exogeneity tests: variables for which the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity can be rejected
after re-testing at the 5% probability level.
First sample: 01/08/2016-04/12/2017
Variables N. of CEs at 5% level
Log(Bitcoin price), Log(Google) (*) 1
Log(Bitcoin price), Log(Google) (*) 1
Log(Bitcoin price), Log(Google) (*) 1
Second sample: 11/12/2017-24/02/2020
Variables N. of CEs at 5% level
Log(Bitcoin price), Log(Hashrate) 1
Log(Bitcoin price), Log(CPM model 1), Log(Transaction volume) 1
Log(Bitcoin price), Log(CPM model 2) 1
Table 7: Multivariate Johansen cointegration tests. The null hypothesis is the absence of cointegration.
The tests considered either the case of an intercept in the cointegration equation (CE) and a trend in
the variables (first sample), or the case of an intercept in the CE only (second sample).
(*) The final model turned out to be the same, independently of wheher we used the hashrate, or the
CPM1, or the CPM2.
In the first sub-sample, the hashrate and the CPM1/CPM2 were never significant, neither as endoge-
nous nor as exogenous variables, and the final model was a bivariate VECM(1) for the Bitcoin price and
Google search data, with transaction volume and transaction fees as exogenous variables. The bitcoin
price was found again to be weakly exogenous, and the direction of causality was from the bitcoin price
to the Google search data. Similarly to the bivariate analysis, a significant cointegration relationship
was found in the second sub-sample between the bitcoin price and the hashrate or its proxies, while
Google data, transaction volume, transaction fees were found mostly to be significant exogenous vari-
ables. Again, the model using the hashrate showed better misspecification tests than those using the
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First sample: 01/08/2016-04/12/2017
Variables: Variables: Variables:
Log(Bitcoin price), Log(Bitcoin price), Log(Bitcoin price),
Log(Google) Log(Google) Log(Google)
(*) (*) (*)
Model selected VECMX(1) VECMX(1) VECMX(1)
Multivariate LM test (lag 4) 0.99 0.99 0.99
Multivariate LM test (lag 8) 0.88 0.88 0.88
Multivariate LM test (lag 12) 0.45 0.45 0.45
Multivariate White test 0.10 0.10 0.10
Multivariate Normality test 0.00 0.00 0.00
BDS (dim=6) residuals 1st eq. 0.73 0.73 0.73
BDS (dim=6) residuals 2nd eq. 0.28 0.28 0.28
Is bitcoin price weakly exogenous? Yes (long-run: pvalue=0.72) Yes (long-run: pvalue=0.72) Yes (long-run: pvalue=0.72)
(short-run: pvalue=0.83) (short-run: pvalue=0.83) (short-run: pvalue=0.83)
Second sample: 11/12/2017-24/02/2020
Variables: Variables: Variables:
Log(Bitcoin price), Log(Bitcoin price), Log(Bitcoin price),
Log(Hashrate) Log(CPM model 1) Log(CPM model 2)
Log(Transaction volume)
Model selected VECMX(6) VECMX(2) VECMX(2)
Multivariate LM test (lag 4) 0.58 0.34 0.68
Multivariate LM test (lag 8) 0.21 0.59 0.18
Multivariate LM test (lag 12) 0.99 0.73 0.28
Multivariate White test 0.40 0.00 0.04
Multivariate Normality test 0.93 0.03 0.00
BDS (dim=6) residuals 1st eq. 0.01 0.05 0.03
BDS (dim=6) residuals 2nd eq. 0.70 0.01 0.66
BDS (dim=6) residuals 3rd eq. / 0.01 /
Is bitcoin price weakly exogenous? Yes (long-run: pvalue=0.60) Yes (long-run: pvalue=0.86) Yes (long-run: pvalue=0.88)
(short-run: pvalue=0.09) (short-run: pvalue=0.81) (short-run: pvalue=0.07)
Table 8: Misspecification tests on the residuals from the multivariate models. P-values smaller than 5%
are reported in bold font.
(*) The final model turned out to be the same, independently of wheher we used the hashrate, or the
CPM1, or the CPM2.
CPMs, and the lagged effects of bitcoin prices on the hashrate were generally longer than the same
effects on the CPMs. No particular difference was found when using the CPM1 or the CPM2. Therefore,
this multivariate evidence confirms the previous bivariate analysis, showing that it is better to consider
directly the hashrate rather than its proxy represented by the bitcoin cost-of-production model when
modeling its relationship with the bitcoin price. Moreover, the causality is always uni-directional going
from the bitcoin price to the hashrate/CPM1/CPM2, with lags ranging from 1 week up to 6 weeks later.
Furthermore, this evidence confirmed that there was a sharp change in market behavior from the first
period to the second one, thus corroborating the past financial literature. The burst of the bubble at
the end of 2017 and the simultaneous introduction of bitcoin futures represented a major change in the
market dynamics, by filtering the group of bitcoin traders (only those better informed and financially
robust survived the market crash) and by improving the market efficiency, respectively.
These findings are consistent with a large literature in energy economics, which showed that oil and
gas returns affect the purchase of the drilling rigs with a delay of up to 3 months, whereas the impact
of changes in the rig count on oil and gas returns is limited or not significant, see Khalifa et al. (2017)
for a large discussion and a detailed review of this literature. Differently from Khalifa et al. (2017)
who found a nonlinear relationship, with oil returns affecting changes in rig counts much stronger when
the oil returns take on very negative values, the BDS tests on our models’ residuals did not highlight
any strong missing nonlinearity. We also tested our data for nonlinear Granger causality using the test
implemented in the NlinTS R package by Hmamouche (2020) that is based on Schreiber (2000) and
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Kraskov et al. (2004), as well as for threshold nonlinear cointegration using the Seo (2006) test, but we
did not find any significant evidence of nonlinearity8. This difference can probably be explained by the
relatively small dimension of our dataset (2016-2020) compared to the one used by Khalifa et al. (2017)
(1990-2015). Moreover, Khalifa et al. (2017) showed that the evidence of non-linearity has softened in
the most recent years, and similar evidence was also reported by Ansari and Kaufmann (2019) who used
a linear cointegrated model.
5 Robustness checks
We wanted to check how our previous results changed when computing the bitcoin cost-of-production
using an electricity price no more fixed to a constant, but able to reflect the changing dynamics of daily
electricity markets. To achieve this goal, we employed the daily data of the Nord pool9 system price,
which is the unconstrained market clearing reference price for the European Nordic region, computed
without any congestion restrictions by setting capacities to infinity10. These daily prices (originally in
Euro/MWh) were transformed into ✩/kWh using the daily fixing of the EURUSD pair, and they are
shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Nord Pool system price and the fixed electricity price of 0.13 ✩/kWh.
The Nord Pool is particularly interesting in our case because it reflects the increasing importance
of renewable energy in the European energy mix (see Jones (2017)-chapter 5 for a discussion at the
textbook level), and the “majority of Bitcoin mining is mainly powered by what would otherwise be a
8These results are not reported for the sake of space and interest and are available from the authors upon request.
9The Nord Pool is a European power exchange owned by Euronext and the continental Nordic and Baltic countries’
Transmission system operators (TSOs). At the time writing this paper, the Nord Pool operates power trading markets in
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Luxembourg,
France and the United Kingdom. See www.nordpoolgroup.com and references therein for more details.
10See www.nordpoolgroup.com/trading/Day-ahead-trading/Price-calculation for more details about its calculation.
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wasted surplus of renewable energy” (de Vries (2019)), particularly hydro-power, see Bendiksen et al.
(2018) for the full details.
The CPMs computed using the Nord Pool electricity prices and the two energy efficiency curves
presented in section 3.1, as well as the CPMs computed with constant electricity prices are reported in
Figure 8 together with the bitcoin market prices.
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Figure 8: Bitcoin cost-of-production prices computed using both constant electricity prices and Nord
Pool prices, together with the bitcoin market price.
The CPMs computed using Nord Pool electricity prices are much lower than the CPMs computed
with a fixed electricity price of 0.13 ✩/kWh, because Nord Pool prices are significantly lower than this
constant price level. As we discussed in Section 3.2, an higher electricity price can capture the effect of
some other mining operational expenses, so the CPMs computed using Nord Pool prices can be considered
as proxies for the marginal cost of production, see Fantazzini (2019) -chapter 4- for a broad discussion
of this issue.
The results of the sequential reduction method for weak exogeneity using the Wald test by Toda and
Yamamoto (1995) and the CPMs using Nord Pool prices are reported in Table 19 (Appendix B), while the
results of the Johansen cointegration tests are reported in Table 20 (Appendix B). The misspecification
tests for the final selected models are reported in Table 21 (Appendix B) 11.
The results using the CPMs with the Nord pool prices are not very dissimilar from the baseline case:
in the first sub-sample, the CPM1/CPM2 were never significant, and the final model was again a bivariate
VECM(1) for the Bitcoin price and Google search data, with transaction volume and transaction fees
as exogenous variables. In the second sub-sample, there were no endogenous variables according to the
11The estimated parameters of the final models for both sub-samples are not reported here for the sake of interest and
space, and are available from the authors upon request.
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sequential reduction method for weak exogeneity, and the Johansen tests similarly found no evidence
of cointegration between the bitcoin market price and the CPMs. The final models turned out to be a
simple bivariate random walk (VAR(0)) and a VAR(4) model for the log-returns of the bitcoin price and
the CPM1/CPM2, respectively, with misspecification tests slightly worse than the baseline case.
In general, the use of the Nord Pool prices to compute the CPMs tend to soften their relationship
with the bitcoin market price: this fact is already evident when looking at the correlation matrices of
the log-returns for the bitcoin price, the baseline CPMs, and the CPMs computed with the Nord pool
prices, which are reported in Table 22 in Appendix B.
6 Conclusions
This paper investigated the relationship between the bitcoin price and the hashrate by disentangling
the effects of the energy efficiency of the bitcoin mining equipment, bitcoin halving, and of structural
breaks on the price dynamics. To reach this aim, we proposed a new methodology based on exponential
smoothing to model the dynamics of the Bitcoin network energy efficiency. We considered either directly
the hashrate or the bitcoin cost-of-production model by Hayes (2017, 2019) as a proxy for the hashrate,
to take any nonlinearity into account. We found that there was neither evidence of Granger-causality
nor cointegration in the first examined sample (01/08/2016-04/12/2017), whereas there was evidence
of uni-directional Granger-causality and cointegration in the second sample (11/12/2017-24/02/2020),
going from the bitcoin price to the hashrate (or to the CPMs) but not vice versa. This evidence is
thus consistent with a large literature in energy economics, which showed that oil and gas returns affect
the purchase of the drilling rigs with a delay of up to 3 months, whereas the impact of changes in
the rig count on oil and gas returns is limited or not significant. Moreover, our analysis showed that
it is better to consider directly the hashrate rather than its proxy represented by the bitcoin cost-of-
production model when modeling its relationship with the bitcoin price. These results also held after we
performed a robustness check to verify how our previous results changed when computing the bitcoin
cost-of-production using an electricity price no more fixed to a constant, but equal to the daily data of
the Nord pool system price.
The evidence reported in this work shows that the bitcoin market has become a more mature and
efficient market after the introduction of regulated futures markets in December 2017. The usual technical
drivers (bitcoin supply and demand), attractiveness indicators, and macroeconomic variables appear to
have become either lagging indicators or no more significant in explaining the dynamics of the bitcoin
price, thus confirming similar results reported by Kapar and Olmo (2020). In this regard, we want
to remark that Shanaev et al. (2019) recently showed that some of the previously reported positive
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relationships between crypto-coins prices and their hashrate, or between crypto-coins prices and their
transaction counts were either spurious due to serial correlation or inconsistent due to endogeneity.
Therefore, the development of “second-generation valuation metrics” for cryptocurrencies (Lehner et al.
(2019) and Shanaev et al. (2019)) able to accommodate both modern empirical finance asset-pricing
models and theory-driven valuation models is definitively a compelling avenue for further research.
22
References
Ansari, E. and Kaufmann, R. K. (2019). The effect of oil and gas price and price volatility on rig activity in tight formations
and opec strategy. Nature Energy, 4(4):321–328.
Aoyagi, J. and Hattori, T. (2019). The empirical analysis of bitcoin market in the general equilibrium framework. Available
at SSRN 3433833.
ASIC miner value (2020). Asic miner value.
Baig, A. S., Haroon, O., and Sabah, N. (2020). Price clustering after the introduction of bitcoin futures. Applied Finance
Letters, 9:36–42.
Bendiksen, C., Gibbons, S., and Lim, E. (2018). The bitcoin mining network-trends, marginal creation cost, electricity
consumption & sources. CoinShares Research, 21.
Blockchain.com (2020a). Blockchain.com: Bitcoin difficulty.
Blockchain.com (2020b). Blockchain.com: Bitcoin Hashrate.
Blockchain.com (2020c). Blockchain.com: Bitcoin total transaction fees.
Broock, W. A., Scheinkman, J. A., Dechert, W. D., and LeBaron, B. (1996). A test for independence based on the
correlation dimension. Econometric reviews, 15(3):197–235.
Brummer, C. (2019). Cryptoassets: legal, regulatory, and monetary perspectives. Oxford University Press.
Burniske, C. and Tatar, J. (2018). Cryptoassets: The Innovative Investor’s Guide to Bitcoin and Beyond. McGraw-Hill.
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (2017). Cme group announces launch of bitcoin futures. Technical report.
Cointelegraph (2020). Hash rate and bitcoin price during mining events: Are they related? Technical report.
Corbet, S., Lucey, B., and Yarovaya, L. (2018). Datestamping the bitcoin and ethereum bubbles. Finance Research Letters,
26:81–88.
Crypto Mining Tools (2020). Crypto mining tools.
de Vries, A. (2019). Renewable energy will not solve bitcoin’s sustainability problem. Joule, 3(4):893–898.
Engle, R. F. and Granger, C. W. (1987). Co-integration and error correction: representation, estimation, and testing.
Econometrica: journal of the Econometric Society, pages 251–276.
Fantazzini, D. (2019). Quantitative finance with R and cryptocurrencies. Amazon KDP, ISBN-13: 978–1090685315.
Fantazzini, D. and Toktamysova, Z. (2015). Forecasting German car sales using Google data and multivariate models.
International Journal of Production Economics, 170:97–135.
Fry, J. (2018). Booms, busts and heavy-tails: The story of bitcoin and cryptocurrency markets? Economics Letters,
171:225–229.
Gerlach, J.-C., Demos, G., and Sornette, D. (2019). Dissection of bitcoin’s multiscale bubble history from january 2012 to
february 2018. Royal Society open science, 6(7):180643.
23
Greenslade, J. V., Hall, S. G., and Henry, S. B. (2002). On the identification of cointegrated systems in small samples:
a modelling strategy with an application to UK wages and prices. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 26(9-
10):1517–1537.
Hattori, T. and Ishida, R. (2020). Did the introduction of bitcoin futures crash the bitcoin market at the end of 2017?
Available at SSRN 3307977.
Hayes, A. S. (2017). Cryptocurrency value formation: An empirical study leading to a cost of production model for valuing
bitcoin. Telematics and Informatics, 34(7):1308–1321.
Hayes, A. S. (2019). Bitcoin price and its marginal cost of production: support for a fundamental value. Applied Economics
Letters, 26(7):554–560.
Hmamouche, Y. (2020). Nlints: Models for non linear causality detection in time series.
Jalan, A., Matkovskyy, R., and Urquhart, A. (2019). What if bitcoin futures had never been introduced? Available at
SSRN 3491272.
Jegadeesh, N. and Titman, S. (1993). Returns to buying winners and selling losers: Implications for stock market efficiency.
The Journal of finance, 48(1):65–91.
Jegadeesh, N. and Titman, S. (2001). Profitability of momentum strategies: An evaluation of alternative explanations. The
Journal of finance, 56(2):699–720.
Johansen, S. et al. (1995). Likelihood-based inference in cointegrated vector autoregressive models. Oxford University Press
on Demand.
Jones, L. E. (2017). Renewable energy integration: practical management of variability, uncertainty, and flexibility in
power grids. Academic Press.
Kapar, B. and Olmo, J. (2020). Analysis of bitcoin prices using market and sentiment variables. The World Economy,
forthcoming.
Khalifa, A., Caporin, M., and Hammoudeh, S. (2017). The relationship between oil prices and rig counts: The importance
of lags. Energy Economics, 63:213–226.
Kjærland, F., Khazal, A., Krogstad, E. A., Nordstrøm, F. B., and Oust, A. (2018). An analysis of bitcoin’s price dynamics.
Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 11(4):63.
Ko¨chling, G., Mu¨ller, J., and Posch, P. N. (2019). Does the introduction of futures improve the efficiency of bitcoin?
Finance Research Letters, 30:367–370.
Kraskov, A., Sto¨gbauer, H., and Grassberger, P. (2004). Estimating mutual information. Physical review E, 69(6):066138.
Kristoufek, L. (2015). What are the main drivers of the bitcoin price? evidence from wavelet coherence analysis. PloS one,
10(4):e0123923.
Lee, J. and Strazicich, M. C. (2003). Minimum lagrange multiplier unit root test with two structural breaks. Review of
economics and statistics, 85(4):1082–1089.
Lehner, E., Ziegler, J. R., and Carter, L. (2019). A call for second-generation cryptocurrency valuation metrics. In
Architectures and Frameworks for Developing and Applying Blockchain Technology, pages 145–166. IGI Global.
24
Liu, R., Wan, S., Zhang, Z., and Zhao, X. (2019). Is the introduction of futures responsible for the crash of bitcoin?
Finance Research Letters.
Lu¨tkepohl, H. (2005). New introduction to multiple time series analysis. Springer Science & Business Media.
Nakamoto, S. (2008). A peer to peer electronic cash system. Technical report.
Pagnotta, E. (2020). Bitcoin as decentralized money: prices, mining, and network security. Technical report.
Pagnotta, E. and Buraschi, A. (2018). An equilibrium valuation of bitcoin and decentralized network assets. Technical
report.
Sa-ngasoongsong, A., Bukkapatnam, S. T., Kim, J., Iyer, P. S., and Suresh, R. (2012). Multi-step sales forecasting in
automotive industry based on structural relationship identification. International Journal of Production Economics,
140(2):875–887.
Santoni, G. J. et al. (1987). The great bull markets 1924-29 and 1982-87: speculative bubbles or economic fundamentals?
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 69(9):16–29.
Schar, F. and Berentsen, A. (2020). Bitcoin, Blockchain, and Cryptoassets: A Comprehensive Introduction. MIT Press.
Schreiber, T. (2000). Measuring information transfer. Physical review letters, 85(2):461.
Seo, M. (2006). Bootstrap testing for the null of no cointegration in a threshold vector error correction model. Journal of
Econometrics, 134(1):129–150.
Shanaev, S., Sharma, S., Shuraeva, A., and Ghimire, B. (2019). The marginal cost of mining, metcalfe’s law and cryp-
tocurrency value formation: Causal inferences from the instrumental variable approach. Technical report.
Stoll, C., Klaaßen, L., and Gallersdo¨rfer, U. (2019). The carbon footprint of bitcoin. Joule, 3(7):1647–1661.
Vogelsang, T. J. and Perron, P. (1998). Additional tests for a unit root allowing for a break in the trend function at an
unknown time. International Economic Review, pages 1073–1100.
Xiong, J., Liu, Q., and Zhao, L. (2020). A new method to verify bitcoin bubbles: Based on the production cost. The North
American Journal of Economics and Finance, 51:101095.
25
Appendix A: a brief overview of Bitcoin’s operation
The complete description of how the Bitcoin network works can be found in the original whitepaper published by Nakamoto
(2008) and it is beyond the scope of this paper. However, certain aspects of its operation are briefly reviewed here to better
understand the research discussed in this paper. The bitcoin supply is completely inelastic, and it is determined by a fixed
emission schedule: for the first 4 years, 50 bitcoins are created on average every 10 minutes. After the first 4 years, the
rate of emission halves, and only 25 bitcoins appear within the network every 10 minutes. The creation of bitcoin is again
halved every 4 years, and this pattern is repeated until the smallest possible unit is created 12. and, after this event, the
emissions stop completely. The total amount of bitcoin to be created will be equal to 21 million bitcoin. Due to the nature
of the bitcoin protocol, the rate of emission cannot be manipulated or altered in any way, so that we already know that
emission of bitcoin will cease in the year 2140.
Newly created bitcoins come with what is called a block : a chunk of transactions ’packaged’ in a special way. The size
of each block is limited, so there is a competition among those using the Bitcoin network to have their transactions inserted
into the earliest block, which gives rise to a fee market. There is also a competition to confirm the latest transactions and
produce a new block: this process is incentivized by the 1) reward offered by the Bitcoin network (for being the first to
confirm a new block), and by the 2) fees collected from all transactions included in the block. To control the rate of the
block issuance, the bitcoin protocol has certain rules in place. Each newly created block has to provide a so called proof of
work to be considered valid. The proof of work is a hard, unforgeable digital evidence of the ’work’ performed to confirm
a block of transactions. In other words, to create a valid block, one has to expend a certain amount of computational
resources and then presents the evidence of that expenditure within the block. Given that the combined computational
power of all those interested in creating a block may increase or decrease, the Bitcoin network has a concept of difficulty: it
tells how much computations on average a miner has to do before he gets a valid proof of work. If the total computational
power in the network suddenly surges, blocks start to come out at a higher rate: the network notices that and readjusts
the difficulty target to slow the rate back down. Thus, the average time between the blocks is always kept at 10 minutes,
independently from the changes in the total computational power. The process of providing the proof of work for a block
is called mining and its participants are called miners. The equipment used by miners is usually called ‘miners’ as well.
Today such equipment is dominated by application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) chips.
The computations that miners do involve a double SHA-256 hash function, so the computational power is often called
hashrate and is measured in hashes per second. The miners are always in an arms race for higher energy efficiency (EEF)
of their ASICs, and for a higher number of hashes per second (usually measured in Ghash/sec). The current state of the
network is such that even a large miner can only hope to find a block once every year or so. Because of that, miners pool
their efforts together to increase their combined hashrate and hope to find blocks at a much faster and steadier rate. The
pool operators coordinate the miners and take a small management fee for that. In this way, an individual miner gives up
some of his expected profit in exchange for steady and predictable payouts. Each miner incurs certain costs when mining
for a block: these costs are both fixed (real estate, equipment, set-up costs) and variable (energy, labor, cooling, etc.). By
far, energy costs are the highest cost: they may be so big, that other costs might be safely neglected, see Stoll et al. (2019)
for more details.
Due to the nature of the Bitcoin network, some of its parameters can be directly observed and their past values are
forever kept in its public blockchain: see, for example, the block reward, the total transaction fees Blockchain.com (2020c),
the hashrate Blockchain.com (2020b) and the difficulty Blockchain.com (2020a). They are widely used in bitcoin-related
research.
12A one hundred millionth of a bitcoin is the smallest unit of the bitcoin currency and it is called a Satoshi.
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Appendix B: Model estimates
Each equation is reported by column, while each cell reports the parameter estimate, its standard error and t-statistic.
Bivariate Analysis
Variables DLog(Bitcoin price) DLog(CPM model 1)
Constant 0.046586 0.019783
-0.01353 -0.0046
[ 3.44263] [ 4.30423]
Table 9: VAR(0) for the Log-returns of the pair: Log(Bitcoin price), Log(CPM model 1). First sample:
01/08/2016-04/12/2017
Variables DLog(Bitcoin price) DLog(CPM model 2)
Constant 0.046586 0.021165
-0.01353 -0.00536
[ 3.44263] [ 3.94997]
Table 10: VAR(0) for the Log-returns of the pair: Log(Bitcoin price), Log(CPM model 2). First sample:
01/08/2016-04/12/2017.
Variables DLog(Bitcoin price) DLog(Hashrate)
DLog(Bitcoin price(-1)) 0.011607 -0.02143
-0.13052 -0.16834
[ 0.08893] [-0.12730]
DLog(Hashrate(-1)) -0.08538 -0.596435
-0.07991 -0.10306
[-1.06849] [-5.78708]
Constant 0.049622 0.047781
-0.01481 -0.0191
[ 3.35113] [ 2.50179]
Table 11: VAR(1) for the Log-returns of the pair: Log(Bitcoin price), Log(Hashrate). First sample:
01/08/2016-04/12/2017
Error Correction (EC) term
Log(Bitcoin price(-1)) 1
Log(CPM model 1(-1)) -0.663981
-0.21282
[-3.11985]
Constant -2.97009
-1.81363
[-1.63765]
Variables DLog(Bitcoin price) DLog(CPM model 1)
EC -0.03118 0.044423
-0.01726 -0.00559
[-1.80600] [ 7.95227]
Table 12: VECM(0) for the variables Log(Bitcoin price) and Log(CPM model 1). Second sample:
11/12/2017-24/02/2020.
27
Error Correction (EC) term
Log(Bitcoin price(-1)) 1
Log(CPM model 2(-1)) -0.692219
-0.21357
[-3.24116]
Constant -2.806945
-1.84646
[-1.52017]
Variables D(Log(Bitcoin price)) D(Log(CPM model 2))
EC -0.029855 0.042844
-0.03116 -0.01095
[-0.95809] [ 3.91310]
0.098178 0.02819
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-1))) -0.09641 -0.03388
[ 1.01832] [ 0.83217]
-0.039484 0.045213
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-2))) -0.09497 -0.03337
[-0.41575] [ 1.35492]
-0.004661 0.171544
D(Log(CPM model 2(-1))) -0.24632 -0.08655
[-0.01892] [ 1.98206]
-0.05507 0.274415
D(Log(CPM model 2(-2))) -0.23794 -0.0836
[-0.23145] [ 3.28235]
Table 13: VECM(2) for the variables Log(Bitcoin price) and Log(CPM model 2). Second sample:
11/12/2017-24/02/2020.
Error Correction (EC) term
Log(Bitcoin price(-1)) 1
Log(Hashrate(-1)) -0.409183
-0.1125
[-3.63727]
Constant -1.256762
-2.00595
[-0.62652]
Variables D(Log(Bitcoin price)) D(Log(Hashrate))
EC -0.049126 0.147903
-0.02597 -0.02708
[-1.89180] [ 5.46226]
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-1))) 0.183584 -0.050318
-0.09211 -0.09605
[ 1.99306] [-0.52390]
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-2))) -0.032037 0.157578
-0.08781 -0.09156
[-0.36485] [ 1.72106]
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-3))) 0.108266 0.04156
-0.08754 -0.09127
[ 1.23682] [ 0.45532]
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-4))) -0.14961 -0.149548
-0.08646 -0.09016
[-1.73033] [-1.65877]
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-5))) -0.034145 0.077298
-0.08735 -0.09108
[-0.39092] [ 0.84871]
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-6))) 0.170596 0.072128
-0.08667 -0.09038
[ 1.96824] [ 0.79808]
D(Log(Hashrate(-1))) -0.076181 -0.736701
-0.08894 -0.09273
[-0.85659] [-7.94419]
D(Log(Hashrate(-2))) 0.009311 -0.438379
-0.10961 -0.11429
[ 0.08495] [-3.83559]
D(Log(Hashrate(-3))) 0.099676 -0.273345
-0.11133 -0.11608
[ 0.89533] [-2.35471]
D(Log(Hashrate(-4))) 0.105471 -0.275003
-0.11083 -0.11556
[ 0.95169] [-2.37976]
D(Log(Hashrate(-5))) -0.005624 -0.29404
-0.1056 -0.11011
[-0.05326] [-2.67035]
D(Log(Hashrate(-6))) 0.171554 -0.154059
-0.08442 -0.08803
[ 2.03213] [-1.75014]
Table 14: VECM(6) for Log(Bitcoin price) and Log(Hashrate). Second sample: 11/12/2017-24/02/2020.
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Multivariate Analysis
Error Correction (EC) term
Log(Bitcoin price(-1)) 1
Log(Google(-1)) -1.000538
-0.04603
[-21.7368]
Constant -5.4321
Variables D(Log(Bitcoin price)) D(Log(Google))
EC -0.020082 0.604649
-0.05422 -0.12658
[-0.37039] [ 4.77691]
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-1))) -0.071363 0.143743
-0.09649 -0.22527
[-0.73957] [ 0.63810]
D(Log(Google(-1))) -0.012273 0.134782
-0.04903 -0.11446
[-0.25031] [ 1.17753]
Constant 0.02109 0.010608
-0.01033 -0.02413
[ 2.04073] [ 0.43967]
D(Log(Transaction fees)) 0.172323 0.040111
-0.04195 -0.09793
[ 4.10790] [ 0.40958]
D(Log(Transaction Volume)) 0.335968 0.443305
-0.06704 -0.15652
[ 5.01110] [ 2.83227]
Table 15: VECMX(1) for Log(Bitcoin price) and Log(Google), with Log(transaction volume) and
Log(Transaction fees) as exogenous variables. First sample: 01/08/2016-04/12/2017. This model turned
out to be the same, independently of wheher we used the hashrate, or the CPM1, or the CPM2.
Error Correction (EC) term
Log(Bitcoin price(-1)) 1
Log(Hashrate(-1)) -0.442911
-0.12766
[-3.46936]
Constant -0.620773
-2.27623
[-0.27272]
Variables D(Log(Bitcoin price)) D(Log(Hashrate))
EC -0.009204 0.143938
-0.01909 -0.02662
[-0.48217] [ 5.40721]
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-1))) 0.105778 -0.053536
-0.07226 -0.10077
[ 1.46388] [-0.53126]
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-2))) 0.032122 0.159914
-0.06866 -0.09575
[ 0.46786] [ 1.67010]
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-3))) -0.026725 0.040566
-0.06826 -0.0952
[-0.39151] [ 0.42612]
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-4))) -0.04931 -0.138195
-0.06636 -0.09255
[-0.74303] [-1.49317]
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-5))) -0.064049 0.073961
-0.06817 -0.09507
[-0.93961] [ 0.77800]
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-6))) 0.132207 0.070274
-0.06677 -0.09312
[ 1.97995] [ 0.75465]
D(Log(Hashrate(-1))) -0.119478 -0.741459
-0.06751 -0.09415
[-1.76969] [-7.87490]
D(Log(Hashrate(-2))) -0.016763 -0.442022
-0.08292 -0.11564
[-0.20217] [-3.82241]
D(Log(Hashrate(-3))) 0.077149 -0.277793
-0.08467 -0.11808
[ 0.91118] [-2.35258]
D(Log(Hashrate(-4))) -0.033626 -0.285352
-0.08528 -0.11893
[-0.39432] [-2.39936]
D(Log(Hashrate(-5))) -0.035212 -0.297643
-0.08005 -0.11164
[-0.43989] [-2.66622]
D(Log(Hashrate(-6))) 0.075737 -0.157866
-0.06518 -0.09091
[ 1.16190] [-1.73659]
DLog(Google) -0.164882 0.015363
-0.04637 -0.06467
[-3.55586] [ 0.23757]
DLog(Transaction fees) 0.074418 0.004869
-0.02798 -0.03902
[ 2.65972] [ 0.12477]
DLog(Transaction Volume) 0.326196 0.020172
-0.04868 -0.06789
[ 6.70053] [ 0.29711]
Table 16: VECMX(6) for Log(Bitcoin price), Log(Hashrate) and Log(Transaction fees), with
Log(transaction volume), Log(Google) and Log(Transaction fees) as exogenous variables. Second sample:
11/12/2017-24/02/2020.
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Error Correction (EC) term
Log(Bitcoin price(-1)) 1
Log(CPM model 1(-1)) -0.631559
-0.07653
[-8.25280]
Log(Transaction Volume(-1)) -0.767616
-0.06355
[-12.0782]
Constant 12.95172
-1.78079
[ 7.27301]
Variables D(Log(Bitcoin price)) D(Log(CPM model 1)) D(Log(Transaction Volume))
EC 0.012154 0.144569 0.024845
-0.07358 -0.02403 -0.11201
[ 0.16519] [ 6.01564] [ 0.22181]
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-1))) -0.033971 -0.051945 0.214159
-0.13416 -0.04382 -0.20424
[-0.25321] [-1.18544] [ 1.04859]
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-2))) -0.080567 0.02964 -0.16257
-0.11971 -0.0391 -0.18223
[-0.67304] [ 0.75810] [-0.89212]
D(Log(CPM model 1(-1))) -0.222182 -0.052122 0.520264
-0.25878 -0.08452 -0.39394
[-0.85858] [-0.61668] [ 1.32066]
D(Log(CPM model 1(-2))) -0.175314 0.122105 -0.855809
-0.25048 -0.08181 -0.38131
[-0.69991] [ 1.49252] [-2.24437]
D(Log(Transaction Volume(-1))) -0.000195 0.05502 -0.342822
-0.08185 -0.02673 -0.1246
[-0.00238] [ 2.05804] [-2.75130]
D(Log(Transaction Volume(-2))) -0.011235 0.028662 -0.220672
-0.07227 -0.0236 -0.11002
[-0.15546] [ 1.21424] [-2.00577]
DLog(Transaction fees) 0.170783 -0.007478 0.27153
-0.03007 -0.00982 -0.04578
[ 5.67931] [-0.76138] [ 5.93147]
DLog(Google) -0.139925 0.013245 0.106468
-0.05695 -0.0186 -0.0867
[-2.45686] [ 0.71203] [ 1.22800]
DLog(SP500) 0.323125 0.287191 0.429537
-0.38611 -0.12611 -0.58779
[ 0.83686] [ 2.27729] [ 0.73077]
Table 17: VECMX(2) for Log(Bitcoin price), Log(CPM model 1) and Log(Transaction volume), with
Log(transaction fees), Log(Google) and Log(SP500) as exogenous variables. Second sample: 11/12/2017-
24/02/2020.
Error Correction (EC) term
Log(Bitcoin price(-1)) 1
Log(CPM model 2(-1)) -0.788774
-0.22735
[-3.46937]
Constant -1.965044
-1.96566
[-0.99969]
Variables D(Log(Bitcoin price)) D(Log(CPM model 2))
EC -0.003327 0.04146
-0.02119 -0.01049
[-0.15697] [ 3.95174]
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-1))) 0.054894 0.029597
-0.07037 -0.03484
[ 0.78005] [ 0.84959]
D(Log(Bitcoin price(-2))) 0.054567 0.041797
-0.0712 -0.03525
[ 0.76640] [ 1.18588]
D(Log(CPM model 2(-1))) -0.367229 0.173548
-0.17893 -0.08858
[-2.05231] [ 1.95926]
D(Log(CPM model 2(-2))) 0.2832 0.287279
-0.17388 -0.08608
[ 1.62872] [ 3.33752]
D(Log(Google)) -0.181629 0.030859
-0.04477 -0.02216
[-4.05680] [ 1.39236]
DLog(Transaction fees) 0.072612 -0.00575
-0.02712 -0.01342
[ 2.67784] [-0.42836]
DLog(Transaction Volume) 0.372787 0.000915
-0.04758 -0.02355
[ 7.83514] [ 0.03883]
Table 18: VECMX(2) for Log(Bitcoin price) and Log(CPM model 2), with Log(transaction fees),
Log(Google) and Log(Transaction volume) as exogenous variables. Second sample: 11/12/2017-
24/02/2020.
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Robustness Checks
First sample: 01/08/2016-04/12/2017
Log(Transaction Fees) Log(Transaction Volume) Log(CPM model 1) Log(SP500) Log(GOLD) Log(Google)
V
Log(Transaction Fees) Log(Transaction Volume) Log(CPM model 2) Log(SP500) Log(GOLD) Log(Google)
V
Second sample: 11/12/2017-24/02/2020
Log(Transaction Fees) Log(Transaction Volume) Log(CPM model 1) Log(SP500) Log(GOLD) Log(Google)
Log(Transaction Fees) Log(Transaction Volume) Log(CPM model 2) Log(SP500) Log(GOLD) Log(Google)
Table 19: Weak exogeneity tests: variables for which the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity can be
rejected after re-testing at the 5% probability level.
First sample: 01/08/2016-04/12/2017
Variables N. of CEs at 5% level
Log(Bitcoin price), Log(Google) (*) 1
Second sample: 11/12/2017-24/02/2020
Variables N. of CEs at 5% level
Log(Bitcoin price), Log(CPM model 1) 0
Log(Bitcoin price), Log(CPM model 2) 0
Table 20: Multivariate Johansen cointegration tests. The null hypothesis is the absence of cointegration.
The tests considered either the case of an intercept in the cointegration equa- tion (CE) and a trend in
the variables (first sample), or the case of an intercept in the CE only (second sample).
(*) The final model turned out to be the same, independently of wheher we used the CPM1, or the
CPM2.
First sample: 01/08/2016-04/12/2017
Variables: Variables:
Log(Bitcoin price), Log(Bitcoin price),
Log(Google) (*) Log(Google) (*)
Model selected VECMX(1) VECMX(1)
Multivariate LM test (lag 4) 0.99 0.99
Multivariate LM test (lag 8) 0.88 0.88
Multivariate LM test (lag 12) 0.45 0.45
Multivariate White test 0.10 0.10
Multivariate Normality test 0.00 0.00
BDS (dim=6) residuals 1st eq. 0.53 0.53
BDS (dim=6) residuals 2nd eq. 0.37 0.37
Is bitcoin price weakly exogenous? Yes (long-run: pvalue=0.72) Yes (long-run: pvalue=0.72)
(short-run: pvalue=0.83) (short-run: pvalue=0.83)
Second sample: 11/12/2017-24/02/2020
Variables: Variables:
Log(Bitcoin price), Log(Bitcoin price),
Log(CPM model 1) Log(CPM model 2)
Model selected VAR(0) for log-returns VAR(4) for log-returns
Multivariate LM test (lag 4) 0.05 0.18
Multivariate LM test (lag 8) 0.29 0.17
Multivariate LM test (lag 12) 0.95 0.87
Multivariate White test 0.00 0.02
Multivariate Normality test 0.01 0.09
BDS (dim=6) residuals 1st eq. 0.00 0.00
BDS (dim=6) residuals 2nd eq. 0.00 0.00
Is bitcoin price weakly exogenous? Yes Yes (short-run: pvalue=0.16)
Table 21: Misspecification tests on the residuals from the multivariate models. P-values smaller than 5%
are reported in bold font.
(*) The final model turned out to be the same, independently of wheher we used the CPM1, or the
CPM2.
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First sample: 01/08/2016-04/12/2017
Bitcoin Market CPM1 (constant CPM2 (constant CPM1 (Nord CPM1 (Nord
price electricity price) electricity price) Pool price) Pool price)
Bitcoin Market p. 1
CPM1 (constant e. p.) 0.09 1
CPM2 (constant e.p.) 0.16 0.89 1
CPM1 (Nord P. p.) -0.08 0.12 0.12 1
CPM2 (Nord P. p.) -0.04 0.13 0.22 0.98 1
Second sample: 11/12/2017-24/02/2020
Bitcoin Market CPM1 (constant CPM2 (constant CPM1 (Nord CPM2 (Nord
price electricity price) electricity price) Pool price) Pool price)
Bitcoin Market p. 1
CPM1 (constant e. p.) -0.13 1
CPM2 (constant e.p.) -0.12 0.89 1
CPM1 (Nord P. p.) -0.07 0.40 0.42 1
CPM2 (Nord P. p.) -0.07 0.42 0.51 0.98 1
Table 22: Correlation matrices of the log-returns for the bitcoin price, the baseline CPMs with constant
electricity, and the CPMs computed with the Nord pool prices.
32
